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A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame 
 
Philosophical debates about the conditions of blameworthiness have a long and 
distinguished history. Recently, however, many philosophers have turned their attention 
to a related (though importantly distinct) issue – not when a given agent is blameworthy 
for what she does, but when a further agent is well-positioned morally to blame her for 
what she does.  As nearly everyone would admit, from the mere fact that someone is 
blameworthy, it doesn’t follow that just anyone is therefore well-positioned morally to 
blame her.  As Marilyn Friedman aptly writes, “If the recipient of blame must meet 
certain criteria to be blameworthy, does not the blamer have to meet certain criteria to be 
blamer-worthy?”1 And so the search is on for such criteria.   
 Such questions are (and have been) naturally pursued under the guise of who has 
or lacks the moral standing to blame.  As we will see below, theorists working on such 
topics have proposed at least four conditions an agent must meet in order to have the 
moral standing to blame a morally responsible wrongdoer:  
 
1. One’s blame would not be (in some relevant way) “hypocritical”.  (The Non-
hypocrisy condition)  
2. One is not oneself “involved in” the target agent’s wrongdoing.  (The Non-
involvement condition)  
3. One must be warranted in believing that the target is indeed blameworthy for the 
wrongdoing. (The Warrant Condition)  
4. The target’s wrongdoing must some of “one’s business”.  (The Business 
Condition)2 
 
These conditions are often proposed as both conditions on one and the same thing, and 
as independent and autonomous – that is, as marking fundamentally different ways of 
“losing standing.”  In this paper, I call both of these claims into question. First, I argue 
that condition (2) reduces to condition (1): when “involvement” removes someone’s 
standing to blame, it does so only by indicating something further about that agent, viz., 
that he or she lacks commitment to the values that condemn the wrongdoer’s action.  
But here we are back to condition (1).  Second, I claim that conditions (3) and (4) are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Friedman 2013: 272.   
2 These conditions (with the exception of condition (3)) are very close to (and partially inspired 
by) those listed in Bell 2013: 264.  
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simply conditions on different things than is condition (1).  As I see it, someone’s 
wrongdoing being “some of one’s business” is a condition on expressing blame, whereas 
the fact that one’s blame would be “hypocritical” is a condition on even (so to speak) 
feeling blame. Further, though it is indeed inappropriate to blame someone one isn’t 
justified in believing is blameworthy, the inappropriateness at issue here is not the same 
inappropriateness at issue in standingless blame. The result: a unified account of (what I 
will call the “basic”) moral standing to blame.   
 The plan of the paper is to take the conditions in reverse order.  I begin by 
briefly arguing that conditions (4) and (3) do not pertain to the sort of “moral standing” I 
aim to investigate; this discussion will therefore help to delineate the issues at stake.   I go 
on to consider G.A. Cohen’s important discussion of these issues, in which he – with 
others – makes a sharp contrast between the relevant “non-involvement” and “non-
hypocrisy” conditions, and provide my argument that what appear to be two 
independent conditions reduce to one. At this stage, I address the question whether 
standing might ever be regained, and consider a condition of non-“moral fragility”. 
Finally, after criticizing R.J. Wallace’s and Kyle Fritz and Daniel Miller’s recent 
discussions of hypocrisy, I conclude by suggesting an account of the nature of this 
condition itself.  Fundamentally, I hope to show, lacking moral standing is a matter – and 
only a matter – of lacking a certain kind of commitment to morality.   
 
The Business Condition 
 
It is a familiar fact of life that not everything everyone else does is “one’s business”. In a 
word, sometimes one might know that someone else has done something criticisable, but 
that person’s wrongdoing is “none of one’s business” – and, accordingly, one lacks a 
certain kind of entitlement to get involved in the situation by publically blaming the 
wrongdoer. Such situations are perhaps most familiar in the context of intimate 
relationships (e.g., between parents and children, and romantic partners).  Suppose, for 
instance, that Ian displays an objectionable tendency to interrupt his partner, Ira.  (We 
gather that Ian is, alas, a bit of a chauvinist.) We might grant that what Ian is doing is 
wrong, and his actions criticisable, while still feeling that it is not our place to say 
anything to Ian – especially, perhaps, in the presence of Ira.  We may feel like this isn’t 
our place, while it would be someone else’s place – someone in Ian’s immediate family, 
say.  If we said something critical to Ian, he may be within his rights to tell us to mind 
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our own business – but this is not, presumably, a reply he can just as easily make to a 
member of his own family.   
 Such situations are, of course, extremely delicate, and sensitive to a host of 
factors, including the severity of the wrongdoing and the nature of the relationships 
involved.  These issues are just now beginning to get the attention they deserve.3 
However, I mention this kind of case as a way of setting it aside.  The distinctive 
response to the critic we are here imagining is this: “mind your own business”.  This is 
not, however, the reply I aim to investigate – a reply we can bring out as follows.  
Suppose Ian has two friends: Julius and Keegan.  We stipulate that this is a case in which 
Ian would be within his rights to tell either of them to mind their own business.  But 
suppose that, unlike Julius, Keegan himself displays the same objectionable tendencies in 
his intimate relationships as does Ian.  Now, to Julius, Ian may say: 
 
Mind your own business. 
 
But to Keegan, Ian may say:  
 
Mind your own business… and, who are you to blame me for this anyway? You 
are in no position to blame me.   
 
And these are importantly different replies.  One says: you lack the standing with me to 
say what you are saying.  Another says: you lack the standing with morality to say what you 
are saying.  In this sort of case, whereas both Julius and Keegan lack a certain kind of 
standing with Ian to intervene in his affairs, Keegan additionally lacks something further – 
and it is this “something further” that is at issue in this paper.  As a first approximation: 
the question for us is not when (and in virtue of what) the “mind your own business” 
reply is appropriate, but when (and in virtue of what) the “who are you to blame me?” 
reply is appropriate.  This is, I take it, what is distinctively at issue concerning the “moral 
standing” to blame.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See especially Radzik 2011 and 2012, Smith 2007: 478, and Bell 2013: 269 - 271. Fritz and Miller 
(2015: 2) set aside the “business condition”, but note that they see it as a condition on “moral 
standing” of the same sort as the “non-hypocrisy” condition.  Coates and Tognazzini (2014) 
consider it under such a heading as well.  For an explicit defense of the business condition as a 
condition on “standing”, see McKiernan 2016, as well as Dadlez 2016.  By way of background: 
the recent focus on moral standing is, arguably, part of a broader trend in which the focus has 
been on the nature and norms of holding responsible (as opposed to the nature and norms of being 
responsible).  For more on this “turn”, see Smith 2007 and McKenna 2012.   
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 Note, however, the following feature of this case.  Suppose both Julius and 
Keegan do “mind their own business” and stay silent.  We might observe that it would 
still be appropriate, other things being equal, for Julius internally to blame Ian.  Indeed, we 
might imagine that Julius would himself be blameworthy if he did not blame Ian in this 
way. Julius might rightly feel indignant with Ian that he is showing this kind of disrespect 
towards Ira – it is just that a justified prohibition on meddling prevents him from 
expressing it. However, there is something inappropriate about Keegan even so much as 
feeling this kind of blame towards Ian: imagine Keegan becoming increasingly internally 
indignant with Ian (“Goodness, I can’t believe this guy is this bad – can’t he see what 
he’s doing?  He needs to show some respect…”) as he witnesses how Ian treats Ira.  
These are, after all, things Keegan often does himself.  Here we might naturally say that, 
even if no one knows it, this is a “reactive attitude” to which Keegan is simply not 
entitled: he lacks the standing to react (and to feel) as he does. It is this lack of standing 
that we are interested in.4  
 Fundamentally, then, what is at issue is not precisely when and why a certain 
response to a critic (“Who are you to blame me?”) is appropriate, but what underlying 
condition makes that response appropriate – an underlying moral condition that might still 
be there, even if no blame is actually expressed, and so no response to the critic ever in 
fact unfolds.  To sum up: because one lacks the standing (with a person) to express blame, 
it does not follow that one lacks standing (with morality) to feel blame. To be clear: what 
is at issue in “feeling blame” is not simply a judgment that the given agent is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 On considering this initial case, an anonymous referee for this journal reports the following 
reaction:  
 
I do not sense any moral inappropriateness in [Keegan’s indignation].  I see that Keegan 
has the same reason to feel the same ways about his own conduct, and he does not.  But 
it is only this lack of disapproval and indignation toward himself that is inappropriate 
about Keegan’s attitude.  Keegan still appropriately [blames] Ian’s conduct, as far as I 
see.  I am missing the lack of moral standing for a feeling of blame that is supposed to 
be illustrated here. 
 
The referee here takes the position of someone we may call the standing skeptic.  According to the 
standing skeptic, in purported cases of “standingless blame”, all that is objectionable is simply the 
absence of the agent’s self-blame, and not the presence of the agent’s blame.  Arguably, however, we 
may counter the standing skeptic as follows. Suppose one’s colleague never replies to emails on 
time – and is remarkably un-self-critical about this failure: he never seems to blame himself.  The 
absence of his self-blame annoys you.  However, one day he gets on your case about your own 
failure to reply promptly to his email.  And this, to be sure, will annoy you yet further – but you 
had already been annoyed by the absence of his self-blame.  What is additionally objectionable, 
then, is not simply an absence, but a presence (perhaps, indeed, the presence together with the 
absence). (I am grateful to Philip Swenson for suggesting these points.)  As I see it, then, in the 
cases I discuss in this paper, what is objectionable is not simply an absence, but a presence.  
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blameworthy, but also a negative reactive attitude such as indignation. I will call the 
standing to feel blame the “basic” moral standing to blame; thus, it doesn’t follow from 
one’s having the basic standing to blame that one has the standing with someone to 
express it, and it doesn’t follow from one’s lacking the standing to express blame that one 
lacks the (basic) standing to feel it.  And what we’re interested in is this: when and why 
one might lack the basic moral standing to blame.   
 
The Warrant Condition 
 
From the discussion so far, it is easy to see how condition (3) (what Friedman has called 
the “warrant condition”) is not, precisely, a condition on the kind of “moral standing” at 
issue in this paper – though it is an important condition on something.  The warrant 
condition, in short, says that, in order appropriately to blame a given wrongdoer, one 
must be justified in believing that the given agent is indeed blameworthy.  Now, this 
certainly seems sensible: it is inappropriate to blame those one isn’t really justified in 
believing are blameworthy.  In cases of expressed blame, one would inappropriately risk 
blaming the innocent – and thereby subjecting someone to the harms of blame who does 
not deserve those harms.  And even in a case of internal blame, there is, plausibly, 
something objectionable about believing too easily (and too willingly) that someone is 
blameworthy, when caution would appear to be in order; here we might think of the vice 
of judgmentalism.5 In any case, when, for instance, all one has heard are incipient 
rumours to the effect that someone did something wrong, one lacks a certain kind of 
entitlement to be indignant with this person – and any such feelings would certainly 
evince a moral fault.   
 Again, these are delicate issues – and they are just now getting the attention they 
deserve.6  What is important for our purposes is simply to see that the “warrant 
condition” does not pertain to the kind of “moral standing” at issue in this paper.  There 
is no distinctive reply to a critic associated with this condition, but we might imagine a 
context in which it may be appropriate to say: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See especially Watson 2013. 
6 The best and most comprehensive defense of an “epistemic norm of blame” is Coates 2016; 
Coates, however, does not (rightly, in my view) defend this norm as a condition on “moral 
standing” per se.  McKiernan 2016, however, defends the “business condition” partly on 
epistemic grounds: often, when you don’t really know the relevant circumstances, getting 
involved is none of one’s business.   
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Look, maybe I’m blameworthy – but, at this stage, all you’ve got to go on is 
rumors: so back off.   
 
Perhaps.  Still, as before, to such a reply we might add a different one:  
 
All of you’ve got to go on is rumors: so back off. … And who are you to blame 
me for this anyway?   
 
Once more: these are fundamentally different replies.  In this case, even if the critic could 
address his epistemic position, he would still lack the moral standing to blame.  In a 
word: I take it the lacking the moral standing to blame is never merely a matter of not 
being justified in believing (or not knowing) that a person is indeed blameworthy; it is a 
condition such that, if one lacks it, one would still lack it even if one knew that the target 
agent is in fact blameworthy.  In particular, if one’s moral standing has been challenged 
(“Who are you…?”), one can never meet this challenge merely by citing one’s evidence 
that the person really is blameworthy.  To cite such evidence is to miss the point entirely.   
 So much for conditions (3) and (4).  The question, then, is this: when and why 
might one lack the moral standing even to feel blame towards someone one knows is in 
fact blameworthy? Who might be disqualified, say, even from being internally indignant 
at Ian’s bad behaviour?  Here two conditions naturally suggest themselves: anyone who is 
himself responsible for Ian’s engaging in this behaviour, and anyone who does such things 
himself. It is here that we enter the arena of “moral standing”.  To such issues I now turn.   
 
Cohen on Hypocrisy and Involvement  
 
Cohen’s paper is one of the first to explicitly focus on the issues here at stake, and is 
worth quoting at length.  He introduces the relevant topic as follows: 
 
We can distinguish three ways in which a person may seek to silence, or to blunt 
the edge of, a critic’s condemnation.  First, she may seek to show that she did 
not, in fact, perform the action under criticism. Second, and without denying that 
she performed that action, she may claim that the action does not warrant moral 
condemnation, because there was an adequate justification for it, or at least a 
legitimate excuse for performing it.  Third, while not denying that the action was 
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performed, and that it is to be condemned (which is not to say: while agreeing that 
it is to be condemned), she can seek to discredit her critic’s assertion of her 
standing as a good faith condemner of the relevant action. (2006: 119) 
 
It is this third way of responding to a critic’s blame that Cohen is interested in, and here 
he identifies two different versions of such a response:    
 
The first of these techniques for compromising a critic’s voice was signalled in 
my childhood by the retort ‘Look who’s talking!’ Shapiro might say, ‘Hey, 
Goldstein, how come you didn’t come to the club last night? All the guys were 
expecting you.’ And Goldstein might reply: ‘Look who’s talking. Twice last week, 
you didn’t show up.’ Unless Shapiro could now point to some relevant difference, 
his power to condemn was compromised, whether or not the criticism he 
originally made of Goldstein was sound. (121 – 122) 
For that first type of would-be discrediting response I have three good labels: 
‘look who’s talking’, ‘pot calling the kettle black’, and ‘tu quoque’. For my 
contrasting second type I have no good vernacular or Latin tag. But I will point 
you in the right direction by reminding you of retorts to criticism like ‘you made 
me do it’, and ‘you started it’, even though those phrases don’t cover all the 
variants of the second type. I shall name the second type ‘You’re involved in it 
yourself’, but if anybody can think of a better name, then suggestions are 
welcome. (123)  
Cohen, then, explicitly contrasts the “non-involvement” condition with the “non-
hypocrisy” condition.7 He goes on:  
In this second type of silencing response you are disabled from condemning me 
not because you are responsible for something similar or worse yourself but 
because you bear at least some responsibility for the very thing that you seek to 
criticize. My Nazi superior cannot condemn me for doing what he orders me on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This contrast has been repeated, amongst other places, in an important series of recent papers 
(Tadros 2009, Duff 2015, and Watson 2015) regarding a “moral predicament in the criminal law” 
(to use the title of Watson’s paper).  For these authors, the question is whether the state is morally 
permitted to hold certain wrongdoers criminally responsible for their crimes, when the state is 
(arguably) complicit in (or otherwise partially responsible for) those very crimes.  Cohen further 
develops his view in Cohen 2012.   
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pain of death to do, even if I should disobey, and accept death. (124) 
Note: Cohen here puts his point in terms of responsibility.  He elaborates as follows:  
I said earlier that among the variants of this second way of deflecting criticism (tu 
quoque was the first) are ‘You started it’ and ‘You made me do it’: the reply has 
many variants, with ‘It’s your fault that I did it’ at one kind of extreme and ‘You 
helped me to do it’ at another. And note that if it’s your fault, in whole or in part, 
that I did it, then it can be your fault for structurally different reasons. Here’s part 
of the relevant wide array: you ordered me to do it, you asked me to do it, you 
forced me to do it, you left me with no reasonable alternative, you gave me the 
means to do it (perhaps by selling me the arms that I needed). When such 
responses from a criticized agent are in place, they compromise criticism that 
comes from the now impugned critic, while leaving third parties entirely free to 
criticize that agent. The functionary who obeys Nazi orders can’t be condemned 
for obeying those orders by the superior who issues the orders; he can 
nevertheless be condemned by us. (126) 
I will return to this example (of the Nazi commander) shortly.  Finally, Cohen writes: 
Note, now, how this second type of challenge, ‘You’re involved in it yourself’, 
differs from ‘Look who’s talking’. ‘Look who’s talking’ says: ‘How can you 
condemn me when you are yourself responsible for something similar, or worse?’ 
In ‘You’re involved in it yourself’ the responding criticized person need make no 
judgment about whether her critic has herself done something similar or worse. 
Instead, ‘You’re involved in it yourself’ says: ‘How can you condemn me when 
you are yourself responsible, or at least co-responsible, for the very thing that you 
are condemning?’ (127) 
And:  
The general form of ‘You’re involved in it yourself’ is this: you are implicated in 
the commission of this very act, as its co-responsible stimulus, commander, 
coercer, guard, assistant, or whatever (whether or not what you did was wrong, 
or similar to what I did, or worse than what I did). (127) 
In this final passage, Cohen seems to suggest that “involvement” can remove standing, 
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even if one’s involvement is in no way criticisable.  It is this that I aim to call into 
question.8 
But let’s go slowly.  First, recall that it is crucial to the phenomenon under 
consideration that it may apply, even if we grant that the relevant target is morally 
responsible.  That is, what we’re interested in is the conditions under which one lacks 
standing to blame someone who is in fact a morally responsible wrongdoer. However, I 
contend that, when we investigate Cohen’s imagined “wide array” of responses more 
carefully, they work in either one of two ways: first, by indicating that the involvement 
took away (or at least diminished) the target’s freedom, and therefore also his moral 
responsibility, or second, by indicating something about the would-be blamer’s 
commitment to the relevant values.  In neither case, however, is mere “involvement” 
doing the work to undermine one’s standing to blame someone who is in fact morally 
responsible.   
 To explain.  Consider, first, “You forced me to do it.” It is, in a sense, easy to see 
how “You forced me to do it” might undermine criticism: insofar as one was forced to 
do what one does, one isn’t responsible. Similar remarks apply to “You made me do it”, 
“You coerced me into doing it,” and “You left me with no reasonable alternative.” If 
your involvement in my coming to do something left me with no reasonable alternative 
to doing it, then your involvement seemingly took away my freedom with respect to 
doing it; instead, I was forced, and so not responsible.  However, insofar as one’s 
response to a critic serves to indicate that one is not even responsible, we do not here have 
an instance of the kind of response at issue – one that explicitly does not deny one’s 
responsibility.  Now, perhaps there are cases in which one might say that one was 
“forced” (or made, or coerced…) to do something, but not in such a way as to render 
one blameless for doing it.  In that case, one might say something like: 
 
Alright, I’m willing to listen to this criticism from you – but not from Jones; he 
was the one that forced me to do it (made me do it/coerced me/left me with no 
reasonable alternative).    
 
Perhaps.  Still, there are also cases in which one might say: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 I make a similar point – as well as introduce the cases of Steffen and Jonas developed below – 
in Todd 2012: 10 – 11.   
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Look, you can’t blame for me doing it – Jones forced me to do it (made me do 
it/coerced me/left me with no reasonable alternative).   
 
And we need to be sure that the relevant response is an instance of the first kind and not 
of the second.  However, if it is indeed a response of the first kind, I claim, then it works 
only by indicating something further about Jones – beyond Jones’s mere responsibility for 
what one does.   
 To see this point, we must consider Cohen’s other examples: 
 
- You helped me to do it. 
- You asked me to do it.  
- You gave me the means to do it.  
- You commanded me to do it.  
 
Crucially, I contend that, in all of these cases, there are ways in which one might have 
done the thing in question, and thereby be responsible (even morally responsible) for what 
the given person does, and yet one’s standing to blame her remains intact.  Such cases all 
display a similar structure – a structure we can bring out by considering Cohen’s case of 
the Nazi commander. 
Now, Cohen certainly seems right that the typical Nazi commander lacks the 
standing to blame his soldiers for faithfully following his orders, even if such orders 
should be disobeyed.   Importantly, however, what accounts for this fact is not merely that 
the commander is morally responsible for what his soldiers do when following his 
orders.  Rather, this is because, for the typical commander, any criticism he might direct 
towards his soldiers for faithfully following his commands would have to be – in a sense 
to be explained – “hypocritical”.   
Consider the case of Steffen: 
 
Steffen is a typical Nazi commander working in a death camp.  He hears rumors 
of an escape attempt.  Thus, he orders Thomas to investigate the fence and 
sound the alarm, should he see any prisoners escaping.  Thomas sees the 
prisoners, sounds the alarm, and the prisoners are caught and executed.  Now, 
Thomas should have let the prisoners go; he should have had mercy and simply 
reported back to Steffen that there was nothing to the rumors.  But he doesn’t.   
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In this case, of course, Steffen lacks the standing to blame Thomas for sounding the 
alarm.  Indeed, absent further details, the case can seem unintelligible: why would Steffen 
– a typical Nazi commander, and someone who presumably endorses actions such as 
Thomas’ – be blaming Thomas for what he does?   
Consider Jonas, however:  
 
Jonas is a Nazi commander working in a death camp.  However, unlike Steffen, 
Jonas is secretly opposed to the Nazi regime.  He thus does everything within his 
power to save the lives of as many prisoners as possible, consistent, of course, 
with maintaining his position as a committed Nazi; Jonas (correctly) reasons that 
he can do much more good secretly sabotaging the Nazi efforts as a trusted 
commander than he could by open defiance.  Jonas hears rumors of an escape.  
In order to keep appearances, he must order someone to investigate the fence.  
Jonas thus orders Thomas to investigate the fence and sound the alarm should he 
see anyone attempting escape.  Jonas chose Thomas for this task because he 
(blamelessly, though incorrectly) thought that, of all the people he might choose, 
Thomas would be the most likely to have mercy and not sound the alarm should 
he actually find prisoners escaping, and instead report back that there was 
nothing to the rumors.  Instead, however, Thomas discovers the escaping 
prisoners, sounds the alarm, and the prisoners are caught and executed.   
 
It seems clear that, in this case, Jonas retains the standing to blame Thomas for sounding 
the alarm.  Hearing the alarm, it seems perfectly appropriate for Jonas to inwardly 
condemn Thomas for not showing mercy.  And later Jonas might confront Thomas 
about his act.  Thomas might say, “But you ordered me to do it!” And Jonas might reply: 
“Yes, I ordered you to do it, but that gives you no excuse; you should have disobeyed my 
orders, even at great risk to yourself.”  What, then, makes the difference (in moral 
standing) between Jonas and Steffen?  Well, it is not that whereas Steffen is responsible for 
what Thomas did, Jonas is not.  Jonas is responsible for what Thomas did; anyway, if 
Steffen is, so is Jonas.  That is, both are morally responsible for what Thomas did, at 
least to the extent that commanders are morally responsible for what their soldiers do 
when faithfully following their orders.  Yet Jonas retains the standing to blame Thomas.  
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Here we have, then, a counterexample to the “non-involvement” condition on the moral 
standing to blame.   
 Similar cases might be constructed for Cohen’s other imagined responses.  In 
each case, one might be “involved in” (and thereby morally responsible for) the relevant 
wrongdoing in the alleged way, yet retain the standing to blame.  In these cases, we might 
say something like:  
 
- Yes, I helped you to do it – but that was because I had no other choice.  You 
should have refused my help.  
- Yes, I asked you to do it – but that was because […]. You shouldn’t have done 
what I asked.   
- Yes, I gave you the means to do it, but that was because […].  You still shouldn’t 
have done what you did.   
 
The result: involvement, in itself, does not remove one’s standing to blame.  It is, at 
most, only a particular kind of involvement that removes standing – a kind that indicates 
something further.  What, then, is this something further? 
 A natural suggestion is that involvement removes standing only when it indicates 
a lack of commitment to the values that would condemn the wrongdoer’s actions.  (I will 
not attempt fully to analyze the sort of commitment at issue; however, it consists, 
minimally, in endorsement of the value as a genuine value, together with at least some 
degree of motivation to act in accordance with the value.) Consider Steffen.  What is it, 
exactly, that is so problematic about Steffen’s purporting now to blame Thomas for 
sounding the alarm, after having commanded him to do so?  It is, presumably, Steffen’s 
own endorsement (or at the very least: non-condemnation) of Thomas’ actions. On being 
confronted by the allies after the war, for instance, Steffen cannot – on pain of the 
sheerest hypocrisy – now turn around and criticize Thomas for what he did, unless, at a 
minimum, he is prepared now also to condemn himself.  Absent some strong indication 
of such a moral transformation, however, Thomas would be entitled to reject Steffen’s 
criticism as entirely hypocritical – as motivated only by an attempt to save his own skin, 
say, or anyway not by concern for the given victims. But note: here the worry turns out 
to be in the arena of “hypocrisy” – that Steffen’s purported condemnation of Thomas 
would have to be (in some relevant sense) hypocritical, or in bad moral faith.  And now 
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we are back to condition (1): the non-hypocrisy condition.  Steffen’s “involvement” in 
what Thomas did has dropped out. 
 Or so it seems to me.  Matt King, however, demurs. King contends that 
involvement can remove standing, even if it doesn’t tell us anything objectionable about 
the agent who blames.9  In support of this point, King gives us the case of Charlie and 
Linus:  
 
Suppose Charlie knows that Linus, who has a weakness for sweets, is trying to 
lose weight. Nevertheless, he takes Linus to a place for dinner that (he knows) is 
located next to an incredible ice cream shop. Quite predictably, after dinner 
Linus visits the shop next door and has some ice cream. Charlie may have acted 
quite permissibly, if a bit unkindly. But even if Linus is to blame for reneging on 
his commitment to diet (e.g., his family and friends might rightly hold him 
responsible on this score), Charlie may not be in a position to legitimately blame 
Linus for it. And this is because Charlie can be partly responsible for Linus’s 
failing even while Linus is wholly responsible for it. 
For those who may be apt to think Charlie is in a perfectly good position 
to blame Linus, consider what such an exchange would look like. Imagine Charlie 
scolding Linus for sheepishly ordering a scoop of mint chocolate chip. Linus’s 
indignation might rightly flare at this point. He might insist, “But you brought me 
here knowing just how difficult it would be for me not to get ice cream. You 
know I am trying to avoid sweets; you know how important losing weight is to 
me. And not only do you throw a huge temptation at me, you have the gall to 
blame me for succumbing to it!” 
It seems to me that something is problematic about Charlie’s blame here, 
and it plausibly has something to do with the fact that he knowingly placed Linus 
in a position to fail. Still, it need not be the case that Charlie has done anything 
wrong. He need not be ill-intentioned in proposing the dinner spot. He might 
reasonably believe that Linus will resist the temptation, or that it is important for 
Linus to meet these challenges head-on. Even so, it seems as though Charlie’s 
involvement reduces his ability to fairly blame his friend. (5 – 6) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Lippert-Rasmussen (2013: 299) seems to agree.   
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My contention here is the following.  Insofar as we are inclined to think that Charlie 
lacks the standing to blame Linus (and, note: whatever “blame” is at issue would have to 
be extremely mild, given the nature of the case), this is because we are thinking that 
Charlie’s decision about where to go to dinner betrays an insufficient degree of care for 
Linus, and, in particular, for the value of his goal to refrain from sweets.  In a word: 
given his choice of dinner location, Charlie cannot now act as if he cares about Linus’ 
refraining from sweets; accordingly, any criticism he might direct towards Linus would 
have to be in bad faith.  Consider, after all, Linus’ imagined speech: “But you brought me 
here knowing just how difficult it would be for me not to get ice cream … you know 
how important losing weight is to me.” It is, I think, difficult not to hear such a speech 
as alleging that, evidently, though this is important to him (Linus), it isn’t important – or 
important enough – to Charlie.  In short, Linus is here charging Charlie with not being 
genuinely committed to the relevant values.  In this case, of course, Charlie’s 
involvement is excellent evidence of this fact – but it is this fact to which Linus rightly 
points.  But once more: the involvement is simply evidence of something further, and, in 
itself, drops out.   
At this stage, we may begin to see the fundamental similarity of the two sorts of 
“replies” Cohen identifies – a similarity Cohen’s discussion seems to obscure.  In 
essence, we have two versions of what is fundamentally the same response:  
 
Who are you to blame me?  Your past behaviour reveals your own non-
commitment to the values that would condemn what I did.  
 
Who are you to blame me?  Your involvement in my action reveals your own non-
commitment to the values that would condemn what I did.   
  
What we have here, then, are simply two different sources of evidence of one and the same 
thing.  
 
Interlude: Standing Regained?  
 
On my account, then, one has standing if and only if one is morally committed to the 
values that condemn the wrongdoer’s actions.  At this stage, however, we might consider 
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the following sort of challenge for this account. Suppose we have someone who is now 
committed to the relevant values, but was not so-committed in the past:   
 
Suppose that Paul, when he is 25, abandons his wife and newborn infant to go 
live an unencumbered life touring around the world and “finding himself”, and 
that his wife and child suffer terribly as a result. Suppose further that later in life, 
at the age of 45, he comes to realize the virtues and obligations of fidelity and 
becomes a committed husband and father to his wife and child, with whom he is 
somehow reconciled. He now holds values, very deeply, which condemn his past 
actions. Now suppose finally that upon hearing of another 25-year-old who has 
abandoned his wife and child to explore the world just as he once did he 
becomes indignant with this other person. It seems that the response, “Who are 
you to blame him!” seems perfectly in order in this circumstance. And yet he is, 
now, very deeply committed to the values which condemn this other young man’s 
actions. Consequently, actually being committed to the values which condemn 
someone’s action is not enough to have standing; rather, it must also never have 
been the case that one lacked such commitment. 10  
 
My contention is that, in a case such as this, Paul indeed does have the (basic) moral 
standing to blame.  It remains to explain away the intuition that he might not.   
First, however, we might simply note the seeming unattractiveness of a 
conception on which standing, once lost, can never be regained.  Isn’t a moral regime on 
which moral standing can never be regained unduly punitive? Plausibly, it should be 
possible to regain standing. But if standing can be regained, why shouldn’t we say that, in 
the above case, Paul has indeed regained it – precisely because he is now genuinely 
committed to the given values? 
Second, we might ask ourselves: what is it that we want in this case?  My own 
thought is this: what we want is for Paul indeed to blame the 25-year-old for what he has 
done.  However, what we don’t want is for this blame to be insensitive to his own past 
history.  We want his blame somehow to be colored or conditioned by his past.  In this 
way, what is ruled out by his past history is not blame, per se, but instead a particular form 
of blame.  For instance, one form of blame that is ruled out is the kind of indignation 
whose content is, “I can’t understand how someone could do something like that!” – but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I owe this objection, and this case, to an anonymous referee for this journal; the case presented 
here is slightly modified from the referee’s own.     
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Paul can indeed understand this, having done it himself.  In this way, when one has 
performed the relevant actions oneself, even if one has now reformed, certain forms of 
shock or surprise are ruled out, given one’s own understanding of precisely the kinds of 
considerations that could lead someone to perform the morally wrong action at issue.  
Further, having done the thing oneself, one should be aware of the kinds of pressures (if 
any) that lead people to do these things; any blame you direct towards the given agent 
thus ought to be sensitive to your knowledge of such pressures.  However, these facts 
arguably leave intact one’s moral standing to blame in a way that is sensitive to one’s past 
history.   
Consider, for instance, this sort of exchange between the parties in the above 
case:  
 
25 year-old: Well, rumor has it that you did this when you were my age.  You’re 
being a bit hypocritical now aren’t you?   
 
Paul: Yes, I did, and I was being just as much of a selfish jerk as you’re being 
now.  I know how you’re justifying all this to yourself (you never got the chance 
to let loose, life has been so unfair to you…), and let me tell you: it is self-serving 
nonsense.   
 
To my ears, this exchange seems perfectly appropriate – and it seems to be Paul blaming 
the 25-year-old.   
 However, I wish to concede to the critic that some things very close to the standing 
at issue in this paper are not regained immediately upon the achievement of moral 
commitment.  Consider, for instance, a (non-moral) case in which a budding film critic, 
in a daring mood, publishes a glowing review of a film that is later widely acknowledged 
to be a disaster.  Such a critic will have done lasting harm to her social standing in the 
relevant aesthetic community; her positive review calls into question the reliability of her 
aesthetic sense – and that standing can hardly be regained simply by admitting (and 
rectifying) her mistake (however exactly that may be done).  In a similar way, someone 
who was only recently able to justify to himself a decision to abandon his family in favor 
of “touring the world” likewise calls into question the reliability of his moral sense; if 
then, that person, even if now reformed, purports to tell us that something is wrong, we 
may doubt that the fact that he is saying it is gives us any (or much) reason to think that it 
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is.  Of course, the worry here decreases over time, as one builds more of a “moral 
record” (by the time he is 45, for instance, Paul may very well have proven the reliability 
of his moral sense). Needless to say, I cannot purport to give a full account of this 
phenomena here; I simply note the following. One’s social standing as reliable moral judge is 
not regained simply by becoming (once more) committed to the given values.  However, 
we should clearly distinguish between such social standing and the basic moral standing 
to blame.   
 My contention is that Paul indeed has the basic moral standing to feel blame, and 
– as the above dialogue brings out – I see no reason why this blame might not be 
appropriately expressed.  But we should also concede the following.  In certain social 
contexts, it can be wrong to insist on exercising a right one actually has.  Sometimes, that 
is, it may be that I have the moral standing to express blame, but that, in the interests of 
others, and in the interests of avoiding even the appearance of impropriety, I should not 
exercise this right.  For instance, even if one knows that one has reformed, others may 
not; accordingly, if one publically blames the wrongdoer, due to our epistemic positions, 
we may be offended – and it may be better for you simply to forego exercising the right 
to blame you actually have than to cause this sort of offense.  Again, a full discussion of 
this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. Once more, however, we should distinguish 
between this kind of social standing (which is not immediately regained with internal 
moral commitment) with the kind of moral standing to blame at issue in this paper 
(which more plausibly is).  
 I wish to make one final (and more general) point about cases in which the old 
blame the young for things they once did themselves.  I grant that, in common moral 
practice, the young often say things like, “Well, you did this when you were our age!” – 
and it can be felt that this compromises the criticism of the old.  However, it is not clear 
that this is always an attempt to undermine the relevant critic’s standing.  Sometimes, 
pointing out that one’s elders did something when they were young is an attempt to 
show that what one is doing really isn’t that bad, or to be condemned in the first place.  
(This phenomenon doesn’t only arise between the young and the old, but this is the 
paradigm case, I believe.) When young adults complain, “Look, you went to parties 
where there was alcohol when you were young!” part of what they may be doing is to say 
that this isn’t really something that is morally bad – it is just thought to be bad by people 
who are spoilsports or overly puritanical (or whatever).  They may or may not be right 
about that – but that is often the idea.  They’re saying, “Look, you did this and survived 
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and are fine!  So let us do it now! Don’t condemn this.”  Arguably, they aren’t saying, 
“Yes, well, even if this is really bad and morally wrong, you can’t blame us – you did it 
yourselves.” At that point, they’ve given too much to their critics.  If they say this, their 
critics (especially if in positions of authority) will just say, “You’re right, we did – and we 
were wrong to have done so, just like you are now. Privileges revoked.” In short, 
sometimes, when we’re speaking to people who are opposed to what we’re doing, but 
who once did what we have just done, we may point to their past behavior not as a way 
to undermine their standing, but instead as a way of trying to undermine their confidence 
that what we’ve done is to be condemned.   
 
Moral Fragility and Hypocrisy 
 
I have argued that the non-involvement condition reduces to a non-hypocrisy condition 
– and that this condition is best stated in terms of a commitment to the values that 
condemn the wrongdoer’s actions.  It turns out, however, that we can plausibly reduce 
yet another proposed condition on moral standing to the non-hypocrisy condition – and 
help us further to clarify the nature of that condition itself.  In addition to conditions (1) 
– (3), Neal Tognazzini and Justin Coates have offered another: a condition of non-
“moral fragility”.  As a first approximation, the condition is this: 
 
5. One is not such that one would have done the same thing as the wrongdoer.   
 
Of course, (5) is in need of clarification, but the rough idea is this: the ordinary non-
hypocrisy condition (on some accounts) says simply that one lacks standing to blame, if 
one has actually done the same or similar things as the given wrongdoer.  (5), however, 
says that, even if you haven’t actually done such things, you lack the standing to blame if 
you would have.  To employ Tognazzini and Coates’ term: these would be cases of 
subjunctive hypocrisy.11   
 I am inclined to agree that (5) is a genuine condition on the moral standing to 
blame.12  However, I contend that, in ordinary moral practice, condition (5) reduces to a 
condition on non-actual hypocrisy. Suppose Smith blames Jones.  Someone says: “Smith, 
don’t get on your high horse: you would’ve done the same thing.”  Now, plausibly, Smith 
cannot simply grant the truth of this conditional, but deny its relevance to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Tognazzini and Coates 2014.  
12 Cf. Lippert-Rasmussen 2013: 305.  
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appropriateness of his blame. In particular, he can’t say, “Sure I would have – but so 
what?” Minimally, he has to deny the truth of the conditional (e.g., by maintaining, at the 
least, that he might not have done what Jones did), or he must maintain, at the least, that 
the conditional is not known to be true (even if isn’t known to be false).  But there are, in 
ordinary practice, two different things we might have in mind when saying that Smith 
“would have done the same thing” as Jones, corresponding to two different sources of 
evidence we might be pointing to which would bear on the truth of the conditional.  First, 
we may be pointing to known facts about Smith – facts about his actual values and his 
actual dispositions.  Second, we might be pointing to facts about Jones’ formative 
circumstances.  In a word, if we are appealing to the former, then the worry once more is 
about actual hypocrisy, and if we are appealing to the latter, we are appealing to facts that 
call into question Jones’ culpability, and therefore we are not appealing to Smith’s lack of 
standing to blame Jones.   
 To explain.  Suppose, again, Smith blames Jones, and someone says to Smith: 
“Don’t get on your high horse; you would’ve done the same thing.”  Now suppose Smith 
replies, “Well, how do you know?” One thing we might say is this: 
 
Oh, come on.  I know you.  You don’t care about those people, the same as 
Jones.  I’ve heard you talk about it.  The only reason you haven’t stolen from 
them yet is that you haven’t had the chance.   
 
Note: here we are appealing to what we actually know about Smith and the moral values 
to which he is actually committed.  His actual values and dispositions make it such that, in 
Jones’ situation, he would have done the same thing – or so we claim.  It is not, then, 
anything fundamentally “subjunctive” that removes Smith’s standing.  More particularly, 
it is not the mere truth of the relevant conditional that removes Smith’s standing, but what 
(at least allegedly) grounds it, viz., his actual bad character (constituted by his actual non-
commitment to the given values).  But now suppose that, when challenged, we instead 
say: 
 
Oh, come on.  Sure, you care about those people, unlike Jones, but if you had 
been raised in the circumstances that Jones was, you would’ve turned out the 
same way.  You can’t go too hard on him.   
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Here what allegedly grounds the truth of the conditional is not facts in particular about 
Smith’s current character, but about Jones’s formative circumstances.  And the claim is that, even 
if you don’t actually have the same values as Jones, you would have, had you been 
subject to his formative circumstances.  More particularly, the claim would seem to be 
this: given Jones’ formative circumstances, it is not clearly fair (which is not to say: it is 
clearly unfair) to expect him to have turned out differently.  After all, insofar as we are 
appealing simply to Jones’s situation, and not to particular knowledge about Smith, the 
claim seems to be that anyone who had been subjected to such circumstances would have 
turned out the same way.  (What we are saying to Smith we could say to anyone.) And if 
everyone would have turned out that way in those circumstances, it isn’t clearly fair to 
expect Jones not to turn out that way.  Arguably, then, the second way of attempting to 
ground the relevant conditional is simply a way of calling into question (or decreasing 
our confidence in) the relevant agent’s culpability.  It is not a way of calling into question 
someone’s standing to blame – and it is this phenomenon we are trying to capture. 
 So far, I have considered two readings of a condition such as (5), and contended 
that whereas the first reading is standing-based, the second is not.  And it is these two 
readings of (5) that, I contend, we find in ordinary moral practice.  Of course, if we stray 
from ordinary practice, we may consider any number of readings of (5), corresponding to 
what we do (or do not) “hold fixed” in the evaluation of the relevant conditional – 
readings whose factual and normative status appear fundamentally uncertain.  Consider, 
for instance, the following:  
 
Well, you can’t blame him.  If you were as morally corrupt as he is, you would 
have done the same thing.   
 
But whereas we may grant the truth of the conditional, we may simply deny its relevance.  
Granted: if I was as morally corrupt, I too would have done that – but I am not that 
morally corrupt, so what, precisely, is the point here?  Or consider:  
 
Well, you can’t blame him.  If you had been raised in precisely the circumstances 
he was, and, not only that, but had the very same genes as he did, then you too 
would have done that.   
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Libertarians, perhaps, may find cause to dispute the truth of the conditional on grounds 
of the indeterminism implied by free will (at most, all one can say is that I may have done 
that) – but short of the appeal to indeterminism, we may also simply ask what it means to 
say that had I had his genes instead of my own, then I would have done that.  Whether 
such a supposition even makes sense is metaphysically controversial.  (What am I, after 
all, on this picture?) Further, once more, insofar as we may grant the truth of the 
conditional, we must grant that it holds for anyone; in this light, the more accurate way of 
putting the point is this:  
 
Well, we can’t blame him.  After all, had we been raised precisely in his 
circumstances, and had his genes instead of our own, then we too would have 
done what we he did.   
 
However, at this stage, it is difficult not to hear this claim as one that is calling into 
question the given agent’s free will, and therefore also his moral responsibility.  
(Someone making such a claim sounds like a hard determinist.) And in this case, once 
more, the claim is not standing-based, but culpability-based. 13  Plausibly, then, the only 
standing-based reading of (5) is the one I have an identified: the one that targets the critic’s 
actual moral commitments.  
 
Back to Hypocrisy 
 
As we saw in Cohen’s discussion above, it is routine for theorists proposing a non-
hypocrisy condition on the moral standing to blame to state it in terms of the would-be 
blamer having done “the same or similar” things as the target. I believe, however, that a 
certain picture is emerging from the discussion so far – a picture that allows us to see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 An anonymous referee, however, raises the possibility of a generalized scepticism about moral 
standing (no one has the moral standing to blame anyone else), though not together with such a 
scepticism about blameworthiness (no one is blameworthy).  My own feeling, however, is that 
such a position is faced with a fundamental tension: the very considerations that would seem to 
suggest that no one has standing (anyone would have done that) seem ineluctably also to be 
considerations that call into question culpability (viz., anyone would have done that!).  More 
particularly, any such position must affirm an instance of the following:  
 
No one can blame him, because anyone would have done that, although he is still 
blameworthy, although anyone would have done that.   
 
And the plausibility of this claim seems difficult to make out.  (I am grateful to Brian Rabern for 
helpful discussion of these issues.)  
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that the emphasis on whether the would-be blamer has actually performed relevantly 
similar actions is misplaced.14  It is not, fundamentally, “having done similar things” that 
removes standing, but that to which having done similar things typically points: non-
commitment to the relevant values. I think we’ll be able to see this point by comparing 
three similar cases: 
 
Simon is a shop owner who himself has a penchant for shoplifting from others.  
One day, Simon gets a call: someone has been shoplifting from his own store.  
On hearing this, Simon burns with rage and incredulity and a desire to confront 
the criminal.   
 
Sebastian is a shop owner who has never himself shoplifted – but not for want 
of trying.  Each time he was on his way to robbing a store, his car broke down – 
or, as it happened, the store was closed.  One day, Sebastian gets a call: someone 
has been shoplifting from his own store.  On hearing this, Sebastian burns with 
rage and incredulity and a desire to confront the criminal.   
 
Samuel is a shop owner who has himself never tried to shoplift – but not for 
want of wishing to do so.  Samuel simply lacks the means to try – a fact he 
regrets.  He simply has no vehicle to travel to other stores, and there are no 
suitable targets within walking distance.  (If there were, Samuel explains, he 
would try to shoplift from those stores.) One day, Samuel gets a call: someone 
has been shoplifting from his own store.  On hearing this, Samuel burns with 
rage and incredulity and a desire to confront the criminal.   
 
The point here is simple.  There is something objectionable about Simon’s blame: given 
how willing he is to subject others to the harms of theft, he is hardly entitled to be 
outraged when he himself is subject to such harms.15  But there is something equally 
objectionable about Sebastian’s blame – the only difference between Sebastian and 
Simon is, for Sebastian, mere luck.  Though he hasn’t actually shoplifted, he is, we might 
say, equally willing to do so – and it was this that we said undermines Simon’s standing 
to blame.  Imagine, for instance, Sebastian trying to defend the appropriateness of his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This objection also applies to Fritz and Miller’s (2015: 5) favoured account of hypocrisy, on 
which one is hypocritical only if one has actually violated the relevant norm.   
15 For more on this theme, see Smilansky 2006.   
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blame as compared to Simon’s: “Well, I’ve never shoplifted from anyone.” The 
appropriate response to Sebastian is to say: Perhaps not – but that’s no thanks to you.  
Precisely the same reasoning seems to indicate that Samuel – who has never even tried to 
shoplift – lacks the standing to blame just as much as does Sebastian, and, in turn, 
Simon.   
 The claim that Simon, Sebastian, and Samuel equally lack the basic standing to 
blame is motivated by a plausible thought: a difference in moral standing can never be a 
mere difference in luck. After all, having the basic moral standing to blame is a matter – 
and solely a matter – of how one stands with morality – a standing with morality that may 
or may not be acknowledged or recognized, but a standing one has or lacks nevertheless.  
And it is a plausible – though, of course, controversial – view that morality does not 
discriminate between agents based on luck, but only due to factors within those agent’s 
control.  Morality, in short, does not make arbitrary distinctions – and the fact (for 
instance) that Sebastian’s car broke down, whereas Simon’s did not, is, in itself, arbitrary.  
Here it is worth remarking on how this constraint does not apply to having the standing 
with a person to express blame.  It may be a sheer a matter of luck that I became Jack’s 
friend, and you did not; and yet, because I am his friend, I am entitled to get involved in 
his affairs in ways that you are not.  Here we have, then, another way in which standing 
with morality differs from standing with persons.   
  What we need, then, is an explanation of Samuel’s lack of standing, and this 
explanation will seemingly have to appeal, fundamentally, not to his actual overt 
behaviour, but to his actual lack of commitment to the relevant values. And what we 
need is explanation of what is problematic about Samuel’s feeling as he does – why it is 
wrong for him (or why he is not entitled) to feel such resentment towards the wrongdoer.  
Of course, it may be an additional wrong if Samuel succeeded actually in confronting the 
wrongdoer – but we may suppose he never gets the chance to do so.  Indeed, we may 
suppose that, shortly after the given episode, the shoplifter simply passes away from 
natural causes.  To point the point more starkly: we may simply suppose that the entire 
episode was fabricated, and never in fact took place.  None of this will change our 
conviction that Samuel lacked the standing to feel as he did.  It is this that we must 
explain.  
 
Fictions and the Standing to Blame 
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This final possibility – that the entire episode may have been fabricated – points to an 
issue that, to my knowledge, has not yet been discussed in the literature on moral 
standing: do we ever lack the standing to blame fictional agents, under the guise of their 
being fictions?  Of course, in the case imagined above, Samuel thinks that there were 
genuine shoplifters, though there weren’t.  Suppose, however, that Samuel were simply 
watching a film – Trainspotting, say – in which one of the characters shoplifts, and imagine 
Samuel becoming morally agitated with that character on account of his behaviour.  Isn’t 
this a case in which Samuel reacts in a way he lacks the moral standing to react?   
 That we are often morally exercised by the actions of characters in fictions is 
obvious.  (If you haven’t felt these emotions in some time, I invite you to become 
acquainted with the deplorable cast of characters in the fantasy series, Game of Thrones.) 
Further, these reactions are not immune from moral evaluation and criticism merely on 
grounds that the relevant targets are fictional entities.  If one is watching a film with a 
partner, for instance, one may very well be annoyed if one’s partner becomes exercised 
about the wrongdoing of a given character, if one’s partner often engages in that very 
same kind of wrongdoing.  Of course, no fictional character will object that he or she is 
being blamed hypocritically, but certainly we might say that the character is being blamed 
hypocritically nevertheless.  We might say, for instance, “Oh, come on – you can’t blame 
her; you do such things all the time!”  In this case, it is precisely one’s moral standing to 
blame that is being challenged.  Hence, I take it as clear that one may lack the (basic) 
moral standing to blame even creatures of fiction. If so, however, then, as we will see 
shortly, this will have important implications for how we explain what is wrong (or 
otherwise objectionable) about standingless blame.16   
  
Wallace on Hypocrisy 
 
I have contended that (a) the conditions on the basic moral standing to blame reduce to 
a non-hypocrisy condition, and that this condition (b) must account for why Samuel lacks 
standing to blame (in the above case), despite not having actually performed the relevant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 As an anonymous referee notes, however, one may be suspicious about blaming fictional 
characters; perhaps this is not genuinely blame, but only proto-blame (or some such).  If one is 
suspicious about blaming fictional characters, I wish to note that one might make the same 
points I make below by appeal to cases like those imagined above, in which Samuel thinks that 
there were shoplifters, even though there weren’t. In this case, it cannot plausibly be objected 
that the attitude Samuel feels is not “real” blame.  The case of blaming fictional characters is thus 
illustrative, I believe – but ultimately dispensable.  
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actions, and (c) why we might lack the standing even to blame fictional characters.  In my 
opinion, the initially most promising account of the way in which hypocrites lack 
standing has been offered by R. Jay Wallace.  As we’ll see, however, his account is not 
always sensitive to the issues discussed above – and seemingly faces a serious dilemma.  
 First, Wallace rightly contends that hypocritical blame can be objectionable even 
if kept private:  
 
It is … possible to blame people for something they have done, resenting them 
or feeling indignant on account of it, without expressing one’s resentment or 
indignation to anyone in particular. … [H]ypocritical blame remains 
objectionable under these circumstances.17 (324) 
Presumably, then, we’ll have to explain why hypocritical private blamers lack standing. 
Wallace now asks: 
Our question now is, why does one undermine one’s standing to be [even 
privately] exercised in this way if one has oneself engaged in the very same 
behavior that one would now condemn? (324) 
As we saw, however, though this is indeed a question, it is not our question: only Simon 
has engaged in the “very same behavior” that he would now condemn, but, plausibly, 
Sebastian and Samuel (who haven’t) lack standing, just as much as he does.  Our 
question is instead closer to: why does one undermine one’s standing to be exercised in 
this way if one is not oneself committed to the norms whose violation one would now 
condemn?  Is this a question Wallace can answer?   
 Perhaps.  Wallace’s account has several aspects, the first of which involves a 
certain kind of “commitment to self-scrutiny”.  He explains:  
   
Blame carries with it a kind of practical commitment to critical self-scrutiny. It is 
not necessarily objectionable to be subject to resentment or indignation about 
offenses committed by others when you have yourself committed similar 
offenses in the past. What is objectionable is to experience these forms of blame 
without subjecting your own attitudes and behavior to critical assessment, and 
bringing them into harmony with your current reactions to the attitudes and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Fritz and Miller (2015: 3) agree.   
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behavior of others. Blame—at least blame that is not repudiated by the person 
subject to it—thus tacitly generates a commitment; the moral objection to 
hypocritical blame can accordingly be understood to be that hypocrites have 
failed to live up to the commitment that they have undertaken through the 
attitudes that constitute their blame. (326) 
To be sure, Wallace contends, we all have a general, standing obligation to self-scrutinize.  
However, Wallace says, this is an obligation that is “strengthened” when one undertakes 
the attitudes constituting blame – an obligation hypocrites fail to fulfill.18 Wallace 
continues:  
Suppose I blame you for your dishonesty when I have regularly been dishonest in 
my interactions with you, and suppose I also fail to reflect on and come to terms 
with my dishonest behavior in the past. This combination of attitudes is not 
merely internally unstable; it also says something about how I regard you. In 
particular, it shows that I take your interests to be less important than my own, 
and that I ascribe to myself a moral standing that I am not willing to grant to you. 
We all have an interest in being protected from the kind of social disapproval and 
opprobrium that are involved in blame. Morality shields us from these effects, 
providing a justification that can disarm opprobrium when we comply with its 
requirements, but we lose this protection when we treat people with a lack of 
consideration and respect. In the hypocritical case just mentioned, I treat your 
dishonesty as a license to disregard your interest in avoiding social 
disapprobation. (328) 
Note: only if I blame you publically (which I may not); there is no social disapprobation 
if there is nothing social.  Wallace continues:  
But I also act as if I continue to deserve protection from the same effect myself, 
despite the fact that I have been dishonest toward you in just the same way. As 
long as it goes uncorrected, this complex stance attaches to my interests greater 
importance than it ascribes to yours, affording my interests a higher standard of 
protection and consideration than it affords to yours. This offends against a 
presumption in favor of the equal standing of persons that I take to be 
fundamental to moral thought. (328) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 2010: 327.   
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Wallace has here – or so I grant – explained how hypocritical public blaming may violate 
the equal standing of persons. But how could this explanation be applied to cases in 
which the hypocritical blame is private19, or directed only towards a fictional character? 
Consider Wallace’s elaboration of his account:   
My suggestion is that this principle of equality is the ultimate ground of the 
commitment that we undertake when we blame another person. In acceding to 
such reactive sentiments as resentment and indignation, we take it that the targets 
of these attitudes have waived their right to protection from moral opprobrium, 
insofar as they have flouted the moral standards that make possible relations of 
mutual regard. But we owe it to those we blame to waive our own claim to 
protection from such negative social effects for infractions of the very same kind. 
(329)  
Do I owe it to King Joffrey (a chief villain in Game of Thrones) to waive my claim of 
protection from the negative social effects of the kind blame I now direct towards him, if 
I have committed infractions of just the same kind?  Of course not; no one could 
possibly owe it to a fictional character to do anything at all.20 Wallace continues: 
This is the commitment to critical self-scrutiny that we impose on ourselves 
when we are subject to attitudes of resentment or indignation that we do not 
repudiate. The commitment in question is social in nature; it is grounded in 
claims that others have against us, and it therefore supports a distinctively moral 
objection to hypocritical moral address. (329) 
Again, however, in becoming morally exercised with King Joffrey, I plausibly do trigger 
the commitment to self-scrutiny – anyway, certainly Wallace should say so.  This 
commitment simply follows upon the attitude of blaming – whether that attitude is 
undertaken privately or publically, or towards a fictional character or a real-life individual. 
But then this commitment cannot be “social in nature” in Wallace’s sense; in particular, it 
cannot be grounded in claims that those we blame have against us – for those we blame 
may be fictions, and the commitment is generated all the same.  Finally, consider 
Wallace’s contention that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This is a question also asked by Fritz and Miller (2015: 7).   
20 As noted above, we might raise the same point in a case in which the blamed party turns out 
not to exist (e.g., there was no shoplifter).  
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By blaming others in ways that mobilize the reactive sentiments, hypocrites are 
participating in a system of social sanction and constraint that essentially involves 
the distribution of esteem and disregard. It is the way they do this— and in 
particular their failure to subject their own behavior to the critical attention they 
train on others—that effectively attaches differential significance to the interests 
of the persons whom they blame and to themselves. (333) 
Again, not if those we blame are fictional characters; where such blame is at issue, the 
concern cannot be that the fictional character is receiving an unfair distribution of 
disregard in an economy of social sanctions.  Wallace’s account is simply not sensitive to 
this kind of case.   
 What, then, may survive of Wallace’s account?  Arguably, Wallace can simply 
jettison the claim about the grounding of the commitment to self-scrutiny; he could simply 
claim that, whatever its grounding, it is, indeed, a commitment.  Whenever you 
experience a blaming emotion, you have a “strengthened” commitment to self-scrutiny – 
a commitment hypocrites fail to meet.  And this is a “failure that undermines one’s 
standing to persist in the blaming attitudes that bring those commitments in their train.” 
Hence: the hypocrite does something wrong, which wrongdoing is of the sort to 
undermine her standing to persist in doing what she does.21  Is this account satisfactory? 
Plausibly it isn’t.  Wallace’s account, I argue, faces a serious dilemma – a dilemma we can 
bring out as follows.  
 Consider Wallace’s claim that the commitment to self-scrutiny – though being a 
standing commitment – is “strengthened” when one takes up the attitude of blame.  What, 
precisely, is the nature of this “strengthening”?  A little reflection will show us that 
Wallace will need this “strengthening” to be rather strong indeed – strong enough to rule 
out the possibility that, in a given case of hypocritical blame, the commitment simply 
doesn’t apply.  That is, suppose we have a paradigmatic case of hypocritical blaming.  We 
want to be able to explain the wrongness of this blame, and accordingly why the blamer 
lacks the standing to engage in it.  Wallace assures us: in blaming, his commitment to 
self-scrutiny was “strengthened” – and he didn’t self-scrutinize.  But we wonder: was it 
strengthened enough?  That is, did his standing, general obligation to self-scrutiny 
become so strong, in this instance, that he violated an actual duty – just now – to self-
scrutinize, a violation to which we can now hold him to account?  We worry – but, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 With Fritz and Miller (2015: 8), I have doubts about this latter claim – but I hereby set them 
aside.   
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concerns whether we can object to the hypocritical blame, we shouldn’t have to.  Now, 
here Wallace may tell us not to worry: there is no possibility that, whereas the given 
person has blamed, he has not incurred, in this instance, a commitment to self-scrutiny.  
On his account, Wallace may say, blame generates an obligation to self-scrutinize just as 
promising generates an obligation to do what one promises.  In Kantian terms: blame 
does not merely “strengthen” a standing, imperfect duty to self-scrutinize.  Like a 
promise, it generates a perfect duty to self-scrutinize.  Talk of strengthened “standing 
commitments” was simply the wrong model.   
 This admission, however, is fatal to Wallace’s account.  For while such an 
account would allow us to criticize the hypocrite, it would allow us also to criticize nearly 
everyone else.  That is, in attempting to condemn the “bad” case, one also would 
condemn the “good” case.  I take it as obvious that, in many cases in which one is in 
perfectly good moral standing, one blames without doing any self-scrutinizing at all.  You 
promise to pick me up from the airport.  You don’t.  It emerges that you have no excuse.  
I become agitated; I blame you. Of course, in all of this, I never self-scrutinized.  But 
then: I didn’t have to; I’m perfectly conscientious in this department.  The point, then, is 
that a given episode of blaming – an entire episode – may be perfectly unobjectionable, 
even if the person who blames never looks inward (at her own attitudes and behavior) at 
all.  Or look at it this way: if every time we blamed, we incurred an obligation to self-
scrutinize (just as, every time we promise, we incur an obligation to do what we promise), 
then there ought to be an awful lot more self-scrutinizing than there is currently – 
indeed, just as much as there is blaming.  But this doesn’t seem plausible.  Accordingly, 
neither does Wallace’s account of the way in which hypocrites lack standing to blame.    
 In sum, Wallace needs the “commitment to self-scrutiny” that one incurs via 
blame to be strong enough so that we can be sure that this is a commitment the hypocrite 
violates on any given occasion of hypocritical blaming.  However, it needs to be weak 
enough so that this is a commitment most blamers in perfectly good moral standing 
actually meet.  But these requirements fundamentally cut against one another: if one 
makes the duty imperfect, then a given hypocritical blamer may satisfy that (general) 
requirement in such a way that we cannot object to her blame (in this instance) on 
grounds that she violates such a duty (in this instance).  But if the duty is a perfect duty, 
incurred solely and directly as a result of acceding to blame, then this is a duty those in 
perfectly good standing themselves routinely violate.  But blamers in good moral 
standing who do not self-scrutinize violate no such duty.  Either way: Wallace’s account 
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cannot give us what we require.   
  
Fritz and Miller and Inconsistent Blame 
Even if Wallace’s precise account cannot give us what we require, perhaps one similar in 
spirit nevertheless does.  Kyle Fritz and Daniel Miller have recently proposed an account 
of the nature and justification of the non-hypocrisy condition inspired, like Wallace’s 
account, by considerations regarding the equality of persons.  The account is both 
elegant and simple; I summarize as follows.  What it is to be a hypocrite is to have an 
unfair differential blaming disposition. However, insofar as one has such a differential blaming 
disposition, one (at least implicitly) rejects the equality of persons.  But it is precisely the 
equality of persons that gives one the right to blame.  The hypocrite therefore forfeits the 
right to blame by (implicitly) rejecting the very thing that would give her such a right.   
 Fritz and Miller develop their account with considerably more care and detail 
than I have provided above.  As they recognize, however, it faces a problem – or, more 
particularly, what I contend is a problem, but which they are content to see as an 
illuminating consequence of their analysis.  The issue is this.  It is not simply the 
hypocritical blamer that has an unfair “differential blaming disposition”; as they say, one 
might also have such a disposition in cases where one’s own attitudes and behavior aren’t 
at issue.  For instance, one might be unfairly differentially disposed to blame colleagues 
A and B for the very same infraction, even if this is an infraction one would never 
commit oneself.  Perhaps one regularly criticizes A for not responding to emails on time, 
but similar behavior from B goes uncriticized – and perhaps there is no adequate moral 
justification for this difference.  Call this sort of person the inconsistent blamer.  More 
particularly, whereas the hypocrite is unfairly inconsistent in his dispositions to blame as 
regards himself, the (merely) inconsistent blamer is inconsistent only as regards others.  
The result: because such blamers also implicitly reject the equality of persons, they too 
lack the standing to blame, for the very same reason as do hypocrites.   
 But this is a problem.  Fritz and Miller are telling us that if we are unfairly 
differentially disposed to blame A and B, then we lack to standing to blame both A and 
B.  As I see it, however, this is implausible.  To see this result, consider the recent 
terrorist attacks on people enjoying nights out in Orlando and Paris.  And now imagine 
those terrorists making the following speech.     
 
You westerners – you have no right to blame us.  You have no right to blame us, 
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first, because we did nothing wrong, and our actions were justified.  But, second, 
even if we are mistaken about this, and our actions were wrong, you still have no 
right to blame us, and that is for the following reason.  Ten months ago fighters 
for our cause attacked a target in Turkey in a similar way as we have attacked 
Paris today.  These events were reported in all of your major news outlets – many 
similar events are not – and yet you hardly seemed to notice.  There was no 
general outpouring of grief for those who lost their lives, and no corresponding 
public anger with those who saw fit to take them. The facts, then, are obvious, 
and they are the following.  You are differentially disposed to blame attackers of 
citizens in the west and attackers of citizens of the middle east, and there is no 
adequate moral justification for this difference. Indeed, this disposition is 
grounded in the sheerest moral prejudice, and betrays an implicit attitude that 
lives of middle easterners are not of equal moral worth and concern. 
Accordingly, you lack the right – and the standing – to blame us attackers of 
western citizens, even if you are right that our actions were morally wrong.   
 
This is a difficult speech.  After all, such a terrorist has a point.  Arguably, we – or many 
of us – are differentially disposed to blame in the indicated way.  Our question, however, 
is this.  Unless we can answer the charge of being improperly differential in our 
dispositions to blame, must we simply walk away in silence after such a speech?  Are we, 
effectively, silenced by the terrorists on grounds that we do not react so negatively to other’s 
terrorism? And here is my answer: I do not see why.  Frankly, it seems bizarre to suppose 
that a terrorist may silence our criticism on grounds that we are – even wrongfully – not 
as disposed to blame others for their terrorism as we are now disposed to blame him for his. 
If Fritz and Miller’s account has this result – and it does – then this account is therefore 
to be rejected.   
To see more clearly why we should reject such an account, consider the 
following.  If the terrorists can make the above speech, we could make the following 
one: 
 
You point out that we are not as disposed to blame attackers in the middle east 
as we are to blame attackers in the west.  We do not here wish to dispute that this 
is so.  Perhaps our differential attitudes here are objectionable, and objectionable 
in just the way (and for just the reasons) you have indicated. But it is your actions 
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that are at issue today – and it is you who have senselessly and unjustly murdered 
hundreds of innocents.  It is frankly irrelevant that we have not – and perhaps we 
have not – similarly and equally blamed others for such crimes in the past, even if 
this differential concern was and is wrongful.  Your speech is frankly a pathetic 
attempt to evade the blame you so richly deserve, and to deflect the moral 
attention on to us when it so clearly belongs on you.  We will address our own 
attitudes another time (though, to be sure, not on account of your moral authority 
to demand that we do so22).  Today, however, we condemn what you did in the 
strongest possible terms.   
 
I think many will agree that this is a reasonable speech; it certainly seems reasonable to 
me.  We might reinforce this judgment by comparing the above speech with a different 
one – a speech that seemingly calls for a different response:  
You have no right to blame us, first, because we did nothing wrong, and our 
actions were justified.  But, second, even if we are mistaken about this, and our 
actions were wrong, you still have no right to blame us, and that is for the 
following reason.  If we are terrorists, so are you.  You know that your 
governments regularly bomb civilian targets in the middle east, and you 
knowingly support those governments with your taxes.  This is tantamount to 
knowingly killing those civilians yourselves.  You do just the same as we do – 
only with different means. Accordingly, you lack the right – and the standing – to 
blame us attackers of western citizens, even if you are right that our actions are 
morally wrong.  
Now, to this speech, it does not seem that we can reply: 
Perhaps we do just the same as you do – perhaps we are, as you say, terrorists 
who kill innocent civilians ourselves.  Even still, that does not affect our right to 
blame you for your terrorist activities here today.   
This is a concession we cannot make, if we wish to retain the standing to blame the 
terrorists for their crimes.  However, we can concede that we have a (wrongful) 
differential blaming disposition, and yet plausibly deny that this affects our standing to 
blame.  In sum, whereas the charge of hypocrisy does (or would) undermine standing, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For more on this important theme, see Tognazzini ms. and Herstein 2016.  
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the charge of inconsistency does not.  What is pathetic about the first speech is the 
terrorist’s conviction that, if we are guilty of the charge, we will not be able to condemn 
him; what is pathetic about the second speech, we must say, is his conviction that we are 
guilty of the charge in the first place.23   
 At this stage, we can, arguably, diagnose precisely where Fritz and Miller’s 
account goes wrong.  We must distinguish between lacking a right (or an entitlement) and 
being disposed to exercise that right (or entitlement) unfairly.  Suppose I am myself a 
perfectly conscientious responder to my colleague’s emails.  And suppose I have two 
colleagues, Ellie and Suilin.  And suppose that, once again, Ellie hasn’t responded to one 
of my emails in a reasonable amount of time – and suppose I confront her about this 
failure.  There is all the difference between the following two possible responses: 
 
You don’t seem so disposed to blame Suilin for this.  So you have no right to 
blame me.   
 
And 
 
You don’t seem so disposed to blame Suilin for this.  You are exercising your 
rights unfairly.   
 
And it is the second of these responses that is the stronger.  If we grant the claim about 
the differential dispositions, Ellie’s best response to me is not to claim that I have no 
standing (or right, or entitlement) to blame her.  Rather, it is to admit that I have that 
standing (or right, or entitlement), but to point out that I am exercising it unfairly, and 
therefore objectionably.  In other words, precisely her complaint is that, though I am 
exercising my right to blame in her case, I am not exercising it in Suilin’s.  Indeed, Fritz 
and Miller’s account would imply that, in this case, I lack even the standing to blame 
Suilin, but precisely Ellie’s complaint is that whereas I have this entitlement, I am not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 An anonymous referee has raised the following concern: though, admittedly, the initial speech 
by the terrorists falls flat, such a speech in the mouth of a (genuinely concerned) third party more 
plausibly does not.  But consider such a speech:  
 
You people – you have no right to blame these terrorists for what they have done here 
today; after all, you weren’t so disposed to blame the Turkish terrorists for what they did 
10 months ago…  
 
But my response is the same: perhaps we were not – and perhaps that is objectionable – but this 
does not undermine my right to blame the terrorists for what they have done here today.   
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exercising it.  Accordingly, once we distinguish between having standing and using or 
exercising standing unfairly, we can see that Fritz and Miller’s account shows too much. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In light of the above, we can see that it is no part of having the standing to blame that one 
is perfectly disposed to exercise that standing fairly.  To be sure, being disposed to exercise 
one’s standing to blame fairly is a moral desideratum, and lacking it is certainly a moral 
fault – but it is not a fault that immediately, and in itself, removes that very standing.  
More particularly, it is enough to have the standing to blame that one is oneself 
committed to the values whose violation one would now condemn, in the sense that one 
endorses that value as a value, and is at least to some degree motivated to uphold it.  In other 
words, it is precisely because I am myself a perfectly conscientious responder to emails 
that Ellie’s charge that I lack the standing to blame her for her non-replies falls flat.  If 
she asks who I am to blame her, my answer is simple: someone who endorses the value 
of timely response and who is motivated to (and, indeed, does in fact) comply with it.  
Being disposed fairly to blame others for violating this norm is certainly necessary for 
something, but it is not necessary to have standing.   
 But now we come to a rather disappointing conclusion.  Fritz and Miller’s 
account promised to derive the non-hypocrisy condition from deeper moral facts about 
the equality of persons.  Hypocrisy involves an undue disposition to blame unfairly, and 
thus an implicit reject of the equality of persons, which equality is the precise basis for 
one’s having the standing to blame; accordingly, hypocrites forfeit the standing that 
would otherwise be granted to them by the equality of persons they implicitly reject.  The 
account is elegant and compelling.  But, as we saw, it shows too much: it would imply 
that the merely inconsistent blamer also lacks standing.  Fritz and Miller are prepared to 
accept this result – but the result, I believe, is not acceptable.  Consequently, we cannot 
derive the non-hypocrisy condition from facts about the equality of persons.   
 And this raises the question: whence might that condition be derived?  More 
particularly, why is it, exactly, that Sebastian lacks the standing internally to blame the 
alleged shoplifter, when he is himself so willing to perform such actions himself?  This is, 
I submit, a question to which we presently do not have an adequate answer.  Some might 
be inclined to respond by saying: so there is no such condition, and we have seen that, 
fundamentally, there is no such thing as lacking the “standing to blame”.  For what it is 
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worth, I think this is the wrong response.  Perhaps the only answer we can give to the 
above question is this: he just does.  That is, perhaps the non-hypocrisy condition on 
having the (basic) moral standing to blame is, itself, basic, precisely in the sense that there 
are no deeper moral facts from which it can be derived.  Perhaps it is simply a fundamental 
fact that, if you lack the requisite commitment to the given values, you lack the standing 
to blame those who would violate them.  It certainly seems to be a fact; why can’t it be 
fundamental?  Perhaps we can simply end the story there, and rest content that we have 
unified what had appeared to be various disparate conditions on having the “standing to 
blame” to one.  In this paper, I contend, an important theoretical unity has been 
achieved, even if no answer to the given question has yet been provided.  Nevertheless: 
if, at the beginning of this paper, you had hoped for a deeper account of why one lacks 
the moral standing to blame when one does, then I certainly don’t blame you.  I began 
with that expectation myself.24   
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